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Abstract
Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the litera-
ture) consists in the allocation of ﬁshing rights to individuals and/or
groups to ﬁsh in certain geographical locations. A requisite for these
communities to be granted ﬁshing rights is the formulation of a man-
agement and exploitation plan (MEP). While thus far the literature
on TURFs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of
it, to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of
enforcement of the MEP that the community, once granted the ﬁsh-
ing use rights, have to comply with. We formally explore this issue
from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm
compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation.
The key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning
mechanism, where ﬁshermen monitor and sanction one another. We
found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part
of the ﬁshing community, TURFs can not avoid the economic over-
exploitation of the ﬁshery. We discuss the importance of economic
incentives (and disincentives) in the formulation of endogenous regu-
lations aimed at ensuring compliance of the MEP. Our results on the
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relevance of economic incentives in the context of a TURF regula-
tion can also be used to highlight the importance of less conventional
enforcement tools.
Keywords: Territorial Use Rights, Enforcement, Game Theory,
Chile
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q22, K42, C72
Resumo
Direitos de Uso Territorial (comumente conhecidos como TURFs
na literatura) consistem na aloca¸ c˜ ao de direitos de pesca a indiv´ ıduos
e/ou grupos para pescar em certas localidades geogr´ aﬁcas. Um re-
quisito para que estas comunidades recebam os direitos de pesca ´ e
a formula¸ c˜ ao de um plano de gerenciamento e explora¸ c˜ ao (MEP).
Enquanto a literatura sobre TURFs at´ e agora tem sido centrada em
seus aspectos biol´ ogicos e t´ ecnicos, em nosso entendimento n˜ ao h´ a
trabalho tratando diretamente com a quest˜ ao de como fazer cumprir
o MEP que a comunidade, uma vez adquiridos os direitos de pesca,
tem que seguir. N´ os exploramos formalmente esta quest˜ ao de uma
perspectiva econˆ omica atrav´ es da formula¸ c˜ ao de um modelo de jogos
est´ atico de cumprimento da norma em um regime de explora¸ c˜ ao de
recursos de propriedade comum. A caracter´ ıstica b´ asica deste jogo ´ e
o mecanismo de monitoramento e san¸ c˜ ao, onde os pescadores moni-
toram e sancionam uns ao outros. N´ os encontramos que na ausˆ encia
de uma regula¸ c˜ ao end´ ogena da parte da comunidade de pescadores,
TURFs n˜ ao podem evitar a explora¸ c˜ ao excessiva da pesca. Discutimos
a importˆ ancia dos incentivos econˆ omicos (e desincentivos) na for-
mula¸ c˜ ao de regula¸ c˜ oes end´ ogenas que objetivam assegurar o cumpri-
mento do MEP. Nossos resultados sobre a relevˆ ancia dos incentivos
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econˆ omicos no contexto de uma regula¸ c˜ ao TURF podem ser usados
para mostrar a importˆ ancia de instrumentos de implementa¸ c˜ ao menos
convencionais.
1 Introduction
In recent times, regulatory authorities have increasingly started
to implement decentralised management systems in ﬁsheries.
One regulatory system that has recently started to attract the
attention of policymakers regarding artisanal ﬁsheries is that of
Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the litera-
ture). TURFs basically consists in the allocation of ﬁshing rights
to individuals and/or groups to ﬁsh in certain geographical lo-
cations (Charles (2002); Christy (1982, 1992, 2000); Townsend
and Charles (1997)). In practice, TURFs have typically been
assigned to communities or ﬁshing organisations which have a
long-standing tradition of eﬃcient/sustainable use of the marine
resources. An example in this regard can be given by referring
to the Japanese case, where ﬁshery community management can
be dated back to the XVIII century (for details, see inter alia:
Yamamoto (1995); Akimichi (1984); Ruddle (1987, 1988, 1989);
Kalland (1984); and Akimichi and Ruddle (1984). TURFS how-
ever were formally established only in 1949 once enacted, the
so-called, “New” Fisheries Law (Ruddle (1989)). A requisite for
these communities to be granted ﬁshing rights, is the formula-
tion of a ﬁshery management plan that must be prepared by a
Fishery Coordination Committee (FCC), which includes among
its members; ﬁshermen, ﬁshery resource experts and representa-
tives of the community in general (the latter appointed by the
regional authority). The Japanese Fisheries Law demands that
this plan must consider the views of the ﬁshermen and the com-
munity and for that purpose the FCC must organise a public
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hearing, before delivering this proposal to the Prefecture Gov-
ernment (regional authority), which is in charge of issuing the
ﬁshing rights and licenses. Once approved this ﬁshery manage-
ment plan, this formal regulation establishes that the only peo-
ple allowed to exploit the coastal ﬁsheries are those belonging
to legally constituted ﬁsher/household associations, known as
Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCAs), which are given the
ﬁshing rights for 10 years (Yamamoto (1995, 2000)).
This type of property rights regime clearly involves the idea of
self-regulation, since FCAs are the main responsible of enforc-
ing the management and exploitation plan, being in charge of
ensuring an equitable, eﬃcient and sustainable operation of the
ﬁsheries (Akimichi (1984)). In general, FCAs operate ﬁsheries
under their control by continuing their long tradition of infor-
mal regulations in the form of social norms, which allow them to
enforce membership, speciﬁc regulations on ﬁshing eﬀort levels,
catch levels, location use rights, etc. (Akimichi (1984); Ruddle
(1989)). While the Japanese case is probably one of the most well
known TURFs systems, it is not unique and similar formal regu-
lations have been established in other countries in ﬁsheries with
long-standing tradition of community management. This is, for
instance, the case of Vanuatu (Johannes (1988); Amos (1993)),
Philippines (Siar et al. (1992); Ferrer (1991), Garcia (1992), Russ
and Alcal´ a (1999) and Fiji (Adams (1993)).
Mainly due to the excellent results achieved in some TURFs,
some countries have started to evaluate the possibility of push-
ing this type of regulation forward and introduce territorial use
rights even in coastal ﬁsheries were property rights have never
been in place. 1 This type of “de novo” implementation is not
1 Prince et al. (1998), for instance, critically discuss the potential
incorporation of TURF regulation in the Australian Abalone ﬁsh-
ery and Freire and Garcia-Allut (2000) consider the introduction of
4 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.6, n.1, p.1–44, Jan/Jul 2005On the Enforcement of Territorial Use Rights Regulations: A Game Theoretic Approach
without its critics (see, for instance, Christy (2000)), and at
present just a few countries have formally implemented this sort
of regulation. Thus far, Chile represents the most important
and ambitious initiative in this respect, establishing in its Gen-
eral Fisheries and Aquaculture Law (GFAL), enacted in 1991,
the allocation of TURFs among ﬁshing communities exploit-
ing benthonic resources 2 (see inter alia, Parma et al. (2003);
Castilla (1994, 1997, 1999); Castilla and Defeo (2001); Castilla
et al. (1998); Castilla and Fern´ andez (1998); Orensanz (2001);
and Gonzalez (1996)). Speciﬁcally, Chilean ﬁshery legislation al-
lows the establishment of areas especially reserved for the use
of artisanal ﬁshing communities. These areas are known as “Ar-
eas for Management and Exploitation of Benthonic Resources”
(AMEBR), and may be allocated to speciﬁc ﬁshing communities.
In order to be granted an AMEBR a community must constitute
a legal organisation (e.g. artisanal ﬁshermen’s associations and
ﬁshermen’s cooperatives, among others) and present a manage-
ment and exploitation project proposal (Gonzalez (1996)). This
proposal must include a baseline study, describing the benthonic
resources existing in the area in terms of species, quantities, lo-
cation (depth), etc., and a management and exploitation plan
(MEP), specifying a set of actions directed to ensure the sus-
tainable management of the ﬁshery. The MEP is based on the
baseline study of the area and includes a proposal of a yearly ex-
ploitation plan of the requested area, specifying harvest periods
and techniques, as well as the criteria applied to determine the
quantity to be harvested of the main species (Gonzalez (1996)).
In other words, the MEP establishes the aggregate eﬀort level
to be used in the ﬁshery. Upon submission and approval of this
management and exploitation project proposal the ﬁshing com-
munity can be granted the AMEBR for a two-year period.
TURFs in the selﬁsh ﬁsheries of Galicia (NW Spain)).
2 For instance, Chilean abalone, sea urchins and macha clams.
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According to GFAL (D.S. 355, 12 June 1995), there are two main
aims associated with the allocation of AMEBRs. First, the re-
duction of aggregate ﬁshing eﬀort in Chilean coastal ﬁsheries,
reverting thus the uncontrolled increment in eﬀort seen in the
past, mainly induced by attractive markets in the presence of
open access conditions (see also, Barros and Aranguez (1993);
Chamorro (1993); Gonzalez (1996); Jerez and Potocnjak (1993);
Pavez (1993)). Second, to improve the enforcement of coastal
ﬁsheries regulations by transferring management responsibilities
from a central authority to artisanal ﬁshing communities (see
also, Chamorro (1993); Gonzalez (1996)). Obviously, these two
issues are very related, since if enforcement is not properly de-
signed, even a very restrictive management and exploitation plan
will not necessarily have the desired impact in terms of reduc-
ing the aggregate eﬀort used in the ﬁshery. This raises the issue
of designing enforcement of the MEP. While the external regu-
latory authority enforces the ﬁshing property rights granted to
the community, it is the own ﬁshermen community which must
enforce and guarantee that the MEP will be complied. Clearly,
in order to do this, each community must organise and set some
norms or rules of behaviour aimed at restricting the exploita-
tion of the resource (e.g. number of boats per person, number
of days ﬁshing per person, number of hours per day ﬁshing per
person, etc.). However, unlike the Japanese case, where there ex-
ists a long-standing tradition of informal regulation in the form
of social norms, in the Chilean case such a form of co-operative
management has never been in place in coastal ﬁshery manage-
ment (in fact Chilean coastal ﬁsheries have been characterised
by a lack of property rights and economic over-exploitation).
Can then ﬁshing communities, with no tradition in co-operative
management, be able to enforce the MEP, achieving appropriate
levels of compliance in terms of the aggregate eﬀort level used in
the ﬁshery? While thus far the literature on TURFs in general,
and the Chilean regulation in particular, has been centred on the
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biological and technical aspects of it (e.g. the description of the
benthonic community existing in the area, the qualiﬁcation of the
main species, etc.), to our knowledge there is no work squarely
dealing with this speciﬁc question. 3 Hence, the main aim of this
paper is to formally explore the problem of enforcement of the
management plan from an economic perspective.
Speciﬁcally, here we examine this issue from a game theoretic
perspective, by assuming that once a ﬁshermen’s associa-
tion/cooperative has been granted ﬁshing rights, a norm aimed
at enforcing the MEP is set in place. This norm prescribes, for
each individual within the ﬁshing community, a particular ex-
traction level. We call this type of informal regulation, endoge-
nous, since this norm is not necessarily legally enforceable, con-
stituting a code of conduct among ﬁshermen, set independently
of the external regulatory authority. The key characteristic of the
game of norm compliance, we propose here, is that it involves a
monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, where ﬁshermen mon-
itor and sanction one another. Unlike most theoretical papers
on social norms in common property resource (CPR) exploita-
tion that consider perfect, deterministic, enforcement of norms,
here we consider an imperfect norm enforcement system, where
not every violator is detected and sanctioned. 4 We assume that
whenever a ﬁsherman is detected violating the norm, a monetary
ﬁne is imposed upon him. While we assume that monitoring and
3 For literature on TURFs analysing the Chilean case see, for in-
stance, the following works: Parma et al. (2003), Castilla (1994, 1997,
1999), Castilla and Defeo (2001), Castilla et al. (1998); Castilla and
Fern´ andez (1998) and Orensanz (2001). While these are some of the
leading authors in the area, in their work there is no a detailed anal-
ysis of the economic considerations of this type of regulation, instead
these articles focus on the biological and technical aspects of it.
4 See, for instance, Sethi and Somanathan (1996, 2001)) and Ostrom
et al. (1992); Ostrom and Gardner (1993).
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sanctioning are costly activities, we also depart from most of the
previous theoretical literature in the sense that these activities
also involve the possibility of a monetary reward subject to the
eﬀective detection and sanction of a violator. In particular, we
suppose that the ﬁne charged to a violator goes entirely to the
ﬁsherman that detected and reported him. This provides an eco-
nomic incentive for ﬁshermen to monitor the eﬀort levels of the
other members of the community. 5 This feature of the model is
included here mainly because it is thought that in a context of
little tradition in co-operative management, individuals can not
only free-ride in terms of using a high ﬁshing eﬀort level (higher
than the norm adopted by the community) but also in terms
of helping monitor the rest of the population. We analyse what
happens in terms of monitoring if this mechanism is in place and
what if it is not. Particularly, the main issues we examine with
this static game are the following. First, the norm compliance de-
cision, namely what is the compliance condition associated with
the decision confronted by the ﬁshermen of whether or not to
abide by the norm and what are the relevant variables involved
in this decision. Second, the monitoring decision, namely what
is the condition to monitor other agents, and also what are the
relevant variables involved in this decision.
The paper has been structured as follows. First, we analyse what
would happen in the absence of endogenous regulation. Clearly,
5 This type of social norm where agents monitor each other has em-
pirical support in the context of CPR exploitation. As Casari and
Plott (2003) report for the case of pasture and forest management
of 13th-19th century communities in the Italian Alps: “For centuries
villages in the Alps employed a special system for managing their
common propertiesIndividual users could inspect other users at their
own cost and impose a predetermined sanction (a ﬁne) when a free
rider was discovered. The ﬁne was paid to the user who found a vio-
lator.”
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in the best scenario, assuming that restricted access to the ﬁsh-
ery is eﬀectible enforced by the external regulatory authority,
the TURFs legislation transform the open access problem in
a common property problem, and therefore the economic over-
exploitation of the ﬁshery is not necessarily avoided. We for-
mally explore this issue in section 2. Second, in section 3 we
formulate a static game of social norm compliance in a regime
of common property resource exploitation. The key character-
istic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism,
where ﬁshermen monitor and sanction one another. Within this
game theoretic framework, we then speciﬁcally address the norm
compliance and monitoring decisions. In particular we consider
two cases when the choices of ﬁshing and monitoring eﬀorts are
independent decisions and when they are dependent. Finally, in
section 4 some concluding remarks are oﬀered. Based on the eco-
nomic model proposed in sections 3, we oﬀer here some speciﬁc
policies recommendations regarding the enforcement design of
the MEP in the context of TURF regulations. Additionally, we
also suggest some avenues for future research in the area.
2 TURFs in the Absence of Endogenous Regulation
Regulations based on TURFs require that the ﬁshing community
manage the resource according to the management and exploita-
tion plan. While the implementation of TURFs typically ensures
that the number of exploiters is reduced to only those associated
with the community or ﬁshing organisation to which the ex-
ploitation of the resource has been guaranteed, a question that
arises is whether or not this ensures the optimal exploitation of
the resource. Belonging to the ﬁshing organisation is guaranteed
by law, so any stranger to the organisation caught ﬁshing in the
regulated territory can be brought to justice. However, this does
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not ensure that people belonging to the community do not use
ﬁshing eﬀort levels higher than those that on aggregate ensure
the compliance of the MEP. This obviously requires some form of
internal organisation, where the members of the TURFs agree on
some “norms” (not necessarily enforced by law) restricting the
exploitation of the commonly owned resource. In the absence of
these norms the problem is reduced to the exploitation of a com-
mon property resource. Hence, in this section we brieﬂy discuss
through a game theoretic explanation what would happen if this
endogenous regulation would not be in place.
Consider a population consisting of n agents, with n ≥ 2. Each
agent has access to a common property resource and can exploit
the resource using a particular eﬀort level which may include
labour and ﬁshing equipment. The resulting action proﬁle (out-
come of the game) e = (e1,...,ei−1,ei,ei+1,...,en) represents
the ﬁshing eﬀort level chosen by each player. In particular, let ei
denote the ﬁshing eﬀort level used by individual i and e−i the list
of elements of the action proﬁle e for all players except i, that is
e−i = (e1,...,ei−1,ei+1,...,en). Hence, we also can express the
action proﬁle e as e = (ei,ee−1. In addition, denote the aggregate
extraction eﬀort devoted by all the n individuals by E. Formally,




The total product is given by a diﬀerentiable real function H
which, in this static version of the common pool resource (CPR)
game, is only a function of extractive eﬀort, that is H ≡ H(E).
Some standard assumptions of the static model of common prop-
erty resource use are the following. First, there are decreasing
returns to eﬀort, that is H(0) = 0, H′(E) > 0, H′′(E) < 0, and
lim
E→∞H′(E) = 0. This, in turn, implies that the average prod-
uct lies above marginal product, i.e.
H(E)
E > H′(E) and that
the average product goes to zero, i.e. lim
E→∞
H(E)
E = 0. Second, we
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assume that the part of the total product obtained by each in-
dividual is directly proportional to her share of eﬀort in total
eﬀort, i.e. ei
H(E)
E . Since the average product H(E)/E is a dimin-
ishing function of E, it is clear that the individual product of
any agent not only depends upon her extractive eﬀort but also
upon the eﬀort introduced by the rest of the agents exploiting
the common resource. Third, we suppose that the markets for
the resulting product and inputs are perfectly competitive, so
that the prices for both are constant at all levels of input and
output. We then normalise the price of a unit of the resulting
product as one and denote the individual cost of a unit of eﬀort
by c. Fourth, we suppose that, 0 < c < H′(0), which guarantees
that an interior solution is obtained. Finally, we assume that the
ﬁshing eﬀort level used by each individual is bounded in such a
way that overcrowding can never be so extreme as to yield cero
or negative payoﬀs, that is, we assume that
H(E)
E > c.
Assume that ﬁshing eﬀort is continuously divisible. A strategy
for agent i is the choice of a ﬁshing eﬀort level, ei. Assuming
that the strategy space is [0,∞) covers all the choices that could
possibly be of interest to the agent. The individual proﬁt of each
ﬁshing ﬁrm can be written as the revenue resulting from the
sale of the amount of resource extracted by the individual minus
the cost of the individual’s extractive eﬀort. Thus the payoﬀ
to agent i, denoted by Ri, from using a ﬁshing eﬀort level ei
when the eﬀort levels used by the other agents in the ﬁshery are
e−i = (e1,...,ei−1,ei+1,...,en) is:
Ri (ei,e−i) = ei
"
H (e1 +     + ei−1 + ei + ei+1 +     + en)





Consequently, the CPR game can be formally described by
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Gcpr = {e1,...,en;R1,...,Rn}. Hence, if (e∗
1,...,e∗
n) is to be a
Nash equilibrium of Gcpr then, for each i, e∗
i must maximise (1)






n). As proposition 1 formally shows below, the Nash equi-
librium eﬀort level introduced by each ﬁsherman will be larger
than the Pareto eﬃcient, socially optimum, level, existing there-
fore an economic over-exploitation of the common ﬁshery. 6
Proposition 1: Let Gcpr = {e1,...,en;R1,...,Rn} be a game
satisfying the assumptions discussed above, and let ¯ E = ¯ ei+...+
¯ en denote the socially optimum, eﬃcient, ﬁshing eﬀort, and E∗ =
e∗
1 + ... + e∗
n the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing eﬀort. We then have
that the Nash equilibrium eﬀort level is larger than the Pareto
eﬃcient, socially optimum, level, i.e. E∗ > ¯ E and therefore there
will be economic over-exploitation of the common ﬁshery.
Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix 1.
In terms of Territorial Use Rights regulations, this result basi-
cally implies that even though the access to the stock can be
legally restricted to a limited number of ﬁshermen, if there is no
any endogenous regulation from the community, restricting the
use of the commonly owned resource, there will still be economic
over-exploitation. In other words, ﬁshermen will use more eﬀort
than that which is socially optimal, i.e. where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost.
6 For versions of this result see, inter alia, Cornes et al. (1986), Das-
gupta and Heal (1979), Funaki and Yamoto (1999), Gordon (1954),
Roemer (1989), Somanathan (1995), Stevenson (1991), and Weitz-
man (1974).
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3 A Static Game of Norm Compliance
If the community establishes an endogenous type of regulation,
where the own users of the ﬁshery are responsible for the enforce-
ment of the eﬀort levels agreed on in the management and ex-
ploitation plan, the result found above will not necessarily hold.
In this section we model this situation by means of a static game
based on a social norm that restrains the use of the common
property resource. In particular, this rule of behaviour involves
a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, where players mon-
itor and sanction one another. Agents who use an eﬀort level
greater than the norm, which we assume here is set equal to the
Pareto eﬃcient eﬀort level of the basic CPR game presented in
the previous section, are sanctioned. Thus, in formal terms, an
agent violates the social norm whenever her individual eﬀort, ei,
is above the norm, ¯ e, that is: ei − ¯ e > 0.
Unlike previous theoretical work on social norms in CPR ex-
ploitation that consider perfect, deterministic, enforcement of
norms, here we consider an imperfect norm enforcement system,
where not every violator is detected and sanctioned. In partic-
ular, in terms of monitoring, we suppose that each player can
monitor other players using a particular eﬀort level. The asso-
ciated action proﬁle m = (m1,...,mi−1,mi,mi+1,...,mn) rep-
resents the monitoring eﬀort level chosen by each player
within the population. Denote by mi the total monitoring ef-
fort level used by player i, to monitor all the rest of the pop-
ulation, namely the other (n − 1) agents exploiting the com-
monly owned resource. Similarly we denote by m−i the list of
elements of the action proﬁle m for all players except i, i.e.
m−i = (m1,...,mi−l,mi+1,...,mn). Thus, the action proﬁle m
can be expressed as m = (mi,m−i). Consequently, we assume
that there exists a probability of being detected and sanctioned
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which depends on the level of monitoring eﬀort devoted by the
rest of the population. Speciﬁcally, we denote by θi,j the proba-
bility that agent i detects and sanctions agent j. We assume that
the more monitoring eﬀort devoted by i the higher the proba-
bility that she will detect agent j. By contrast, we suppose that
the monitoring eﬀort exerted by j, does not aﬀect the probability
θi,j, i.e. agent j does not monitor herself. We also assume that
the monitoring eﬀort used by the rest of the population, namely
the monitoring eﬀort of all other agents besides players i and
j, will reduce θi,j, since this diminishes the chances that player
i will be the one that detects agent j. Formally, we denote by
m−(i,j) = (m1,...,mi−1,mi+1,...,mj−1,mj+1,...,mn) the mon-
itoring eﬀort of all other agents besides players i and j. Hence
we deﬁne θi,j = θi,j(mi,m−(i,j)). Similarly, we denote by θj,i the
probability that at least one agent j detects and sanctions agent
i, and deﬁne it as follows: θj,i = θj,i(m−i). 7 Formally, our as-












≥ 0 ∀ k = 1,...,n with k  = i and





−i ≤ 0. We further
assume that θij(0,m−(i,j)) = 0, i.e., the probability that agent
“i detects agent j” is zero whenever the monitoring eﬀort ex-
erted by i is zero, which also applies for θj,i, that is θj,i(0) = 0.
7 We notice here that because we assume that an agent can be sanc-
tioned only once, her decision is likely to be based upon the perceived
probability that at least one agent detects her in violation. Consider-
ing that the relevant sample space is composed by the ﬁnite number
of events: agent 1 detects a violation of agent i, agent 2, detects a
violation of agent i, etc., it can be shown that the probability that
at least one of those events occurs is found by adding the probability
of each event, then subtracting the probabilities of two-ways inter-
sections, adding the probability of all three-way intersections, and so
forth. That is the so called inclusion-exclusion principle. For details,
see for example, Grinstead and Snell (1997).
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However, we suppose that the marginal probabilities of detection
and sanctioning at zero monitoring level are greater than zero,
i.e.
∂θi,j(0,m−i,j))
∂mi > 0, and
∂θj,i(0)
∂m−i > 0.
In terms of the costs associated with monitoring and sanctioning,
this model also deviates from the previous theoretical literature
on CPR exploitation in the sense that these are not only costly
activities for agents, but also involve the possibility of a mone-
tary reward subject to the eﬀective detection of a violator. Here
we also distinguish between monitoring and sanctioning costs.
The former is given by the function ϕ(mi), which accounts for
the total cost of monitoring for agent i. Formally, we assume






i ≤ 0. The latter is denoted by γ, which
is an exogenous variable, and represents the transaction costs
associated with reporting one agent. 8
Regarding the beneﬁts of monitoring and sanctioning other
agents, here we suppose that whenever an agent is detected vio-
lating the norm, a monetary ﬁne will be imposed upon her. This
ﬁne goes entirely to the agent that detected and reported her.
Moreover, we assume that the magnitude of the ﬁne depends
upon the extent of the violation. Thus, if a player decides not
to abide by the eﬀort limit, if caught, the penalty is given by,





i ≥ 0, ∀ ei > ¯ e and s(ei − ¯ e) = 0,
for ei − ¯ e ≤ 0. We also assume that this penalty is zero for zero
8 For instance, this could be the case of a sanctioning system where
the monitoring agent must report any violation to the board of the
ﬁshermen’s association/co-operative, which ﬁnally decides, after an
inspection, whether or not the reported agent is violating the social
norm or not. In other words, here we assume that not only monitoring
other agents is costly, but also reporting a violator, to be sanctioned,
involves a cost. This idea has empirical support in local commons,
for a particular example see Casari and Plott.
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violation, i.e. s = s(0) = 0, but that the marginal penalty for
zero violation is greater than zero, i.e.
∂s(0)
∂ei > 0.
Considering the assumptions discussed above the expected proﬁt
of individual i is given by:








[s(ej − ¯ e) − γ] − ϕ(mi) (2)
where Ri(ei,e−i) represents agent i’s net payoﬀ under the basic
CPR setting presented in section 2, see equation (1). We assume
that agent i can choose the amount of her eﬀort, which depend-
ing of its value, can involve or not a violation of the social norm,
formally ei − ¯ e ≥ 0. If agent i, is detected violating the norm
she will have to pay a ﬁne proportional to her violation, that is
s(ei − ¯ e). As it was argued before, since, monitoring is imper-
fect, the detection of her violation by at least one agent within
the population, say agent j, will depend upon the probability
θj,i(m−i), which is function of the monitoring eﬀort put by agent
j and that of the rest of the population. The total expected
cost for agent i of being caught violating the norm is given by
θj,i(m−i)s(ei − ¯ e).
Agent i also chooses her monitoring eﬀort level, which is re-
stricted to be non negative, i.e. mi ≥ 0. Given this level of
monitoring eﬀort, player i can be able to detect a violator and
receive the associated payment, given by the ﬁne levied to the
oﬀender. We have that the expected reward to agent i for eﬀec-
tively detect and sanction a violator j is given by θi,js(ej − ¯ e),
that is the probability that agent i detects agent j multiplied
by the associated monetary reward given by the ﬁne charged
to agent j. Similarly, the expected cost for agent i of sanction-
ing agent j is θi,jγ. Since we assume that given her monitoring
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eﬀort, agent i can monitor and sanction all the rest of the popu-
lation, that is (n−1) players, the net expected payoﬀ associated
with sanctioning other agents who violate the norm is given by
n P
j =i
θi,j(mi,m−(i,j))[s(ej − ¯ e) − γ]. 9
Finally, in terms of the choices of ﬁshing and monitoring eﬀort
we assume that they are bounded by a total eﬀort level which
we normalize as one. Formally, we assume that ei + mi ≤ 1.
The norm compliance game can be formally described by Gnc =
{(e1,...,en),(m1,...,mn);π1,...,πn} which corresponds to an
n-person normal form game where (ei,mi), with ei ≥ ¯ e and
mi ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1,...,n, denote the action sets given by the ex-
traction and monitoring eﬀort levels, and πi, ∀ i = 1,...,n, the
material payoﬀ functions, given by the expected proﬁt presented
in equation (2).
Consequently, we have that the Nash equilibrium of this norm
compliance game, given by the pair (e∗,m∗), is found by solving
the following optimization problem. 10
max
ei,mi








[s(ej − ¯ e) − γ] − ϕ(mi) (3)
s.t. ei − ¯ e≥0
9 The cost of monitoring peers is intended to represent the fact that
such eﬀort might require the use of some monitoring equipment, or
other inputs.
10 Throughout the paper we assume that agents are risk neutral and
maximise expected proﬁts. We denote by an asterisk optimal choices.
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mi ≥0
1 − ei − mi ≥0
The Lagrange equation for (3) is:








[s(ej − ¯ e) − γ] − φ(mi)
+µmi + η(ei − ¯ e) + λ(1 − ei − mi) (4)







∂s(ei − ¯ e)
∂ei
+ η − λ = 0 (5a)
∂L
∂η















= mi ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, µmi = 0 (5d)
∂L
∂λ
= 1 − ei − mi ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λ(1 − ei − mi) = 0 (5e)
We assume that (5a-e) are necessary and suﬃcient to determine
the agent optimal allocation of extraction and monitoring ef-
fort. 11
11 In general terms, Kuhn-Tucker suﬃciency requires πi being a con-
cave function and that the feasible set contains only convex functions
∀ i = 1,...,n.
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3.1 Fishing and Monitoring as Independent Decisions
It should be noted that the formulation of the optimization prob-
lem presented in (4) allow us to study both cases, when the
choices of ﬁshing and monitoring eﬀorts are independent deci-
sions and when they are dependent. In the former case we can
assume that 1 > ei+mi, which implies that the choices of ﬁshing
and monitoring eﬀort are lower than the total eﬀort level avail-
able to each individual. Therefore in this case there is no a trade-
oﬀ between devoting resources to ﬁshing or monitoring activities.
In the latter case, by contrast, we assume that 1 = ei+mi so any
amount of eﬀort dedicated to monitoring will reduce the amount
of eﬀort that the individual can spend on ﬁshing and vice versa.
Let us ﬁrst analyse the case when the choices of ﬁshing and mon-
itoring eﬀorts are independent decisions, that is 1 > ei + mi. In
particular we will derive some results related to the compliance
conditions and the optimal level of monitoring eﬀort under this
setting.
Result 1: Given 1 > ei+mi, a necessary condition for violating








∂s(e∗ − ¯ e)
∂ei
. (6)
Proof of Result 1: Since we assume that 1 > ei + mi by (5e)
we obtain λ = 0. Suppose now that ei > ¯ e. Then, if this choice
of ei is optimal, ∂L
∂ei = 0. Since, from (5b), ei > ¯ e implies η = 0,





∂s(ei − ¯ e)
∂ei
= 0. (7)
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Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction eﬀort level ei = e∗, for all play-
ers i, with e∗ > ¯ e. Thus, an equilibrium strategy must satisfy
condition (6). Q.E.D.
Result 1 shows that an individual violates the social norm to
the extent that her marginal revenue from using a ﬁshing ef-




with e∗ > ¯ e, oﬀsets the expected marginal costs associated with
her violation, i.e. θj,i(m−i)
∂s(e∗−¯ e)
∂ei . In particular, the expected
marginal cost from violating the norm depends on the marginal
sanction, ∂s
∂ei, and the probability of detection and sanctioning,
θj,i ∀ j = 1,...,n with j  = i. By deﬁnition the marginal sanction
is increasing in ﬁshing eﬀort, and therefore an increase in ﬁshing
eﬀort will increase the expected marginal cost of violating the
norm. Similarly, an increase in the individual level of monitoring
will also trigger an increase in the probability of being caught
and consequently will increase the expected marginal cost of vi-
olating the norm. In terms of the agent’s marginal revenue (see
equation (A3) from Appendix 1) we have that this is function
of the average product of ﬁshing eﬀort,
H(E)
E , the marginal prod-
uct of ﬁshing eﬀort,H′(E), the individual cost of ﬁshing eﬀort, c,
and the number of ﬁshing ﬁrms sharing the CPR, n. Hence, we
have that an increase in the average product, and the marginal
product will trigger an increase in the marginal revenue from
using a ﬁshing eﬀort level higher than the socially allowed level.
By contrast, an increase in the individual cost of ﬁshing eﬀort
and the number of ﬁshing ﬁrms sharing the CPR will reduce the
marginal revenue from violating the norm.
It should also be noted that from Result 1 it is clear that in
this setting, the individual’s optimal choice of ﬁshing eﬀort is
independent of her choice of monitoring eﬀort, mi. However, as
already noted the individual decision does depends on the indi-
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vidual monitoring level devoted by all other individuals, that is
the individual monitoring level of all other individuals, m−i =
(m1,...,mi−1,mi+1,...,mn). In other words, each individual de-
cision regarding her level of violation is dependent of the other
agents’ enforcement strategy.
We can also derive the condition ensuring that an individual
complies with the social norm. Our next result presents a neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition for norm compliance.
Result 2: Given ei + mi < 1, an agent chooses to comply with











Proof of Result 2: Since we assume that ei + mi < 1 by (5e)
we obtain λ = 0. Suppose now that ei = ¯ e. Then, if this choice
of ei is optimal, ∂L
∂ei = 0. Since, from (5b), ei = ¯ e implies η ≥ 0,
then by equation (5a) the following condition is clearly necessary







Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction eﬀort level by ei = e∗, for all
players i, with e∗ = ¯ e. Thus, an equilibrium strategy must satisfy
condition (8). To show suﬃciency, suppose to the contrary that
(8) holds but ei − ¯ e > 0. Given ei − ¯ e > 0, equation (5b) implies
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which implies that equation (10) contradicts equation (8). Hence
we have established the suﬃciency of (8) for an optimal choice
of e∗ = ¯ e. Q.E.D.
From Result 2, an agent will be compliant if the marginal revenue
from using a ﬁshing eﬀort level equivalent to the one established
by the social norm,
∂Ri(e∗,e∗
−i)
∂ei with e∗ = ¯ e, is lower or equals




As in Result 1, it is obvious that in this setting the compliance
decision is independent of the agent’s own monitoring eﬀort, but
dependent of the population’s enforcement strategy, m−i =
(m1,...,mi−1,mi+1,...,mn). An important conclusion that can
be inferred from Result 2 is that if there is no monitoring eﬀort
within the ﬁshery, compliance is not a possible outcome. We
formally present this additional result in Corollary 1 as follows:
Corollary 1: Norm compliance is not possible without moni-
toring eﬀort being carried out in the ﬁshery.
Proof of Corollary 1: From equation (8), zero monitoring
eﬀort within the ﬁshery, i.e. mj = m−(i,j) = 0, implies that:
∂Ri(e∗,e∗
−i)




Results 1 and 2 can be better explained through a graphical
analysis. Figure 1 below shows the solution to equations (6) and
(8) for particular forms of the penalty function, s, and probability
function, θj,i.
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Fig. 1. The Norm Compliance Decision with Independent Fishing and
Monitoring Choices
From Figure 1 (see point (1)), it is clear that the ﬁrm sets its
ﬁshing eﬀort to a level e∗ in excess of the norm, e∗ > ¯ e, where
marginal revenue (net of extractive eﬀort costs) equals the ex-
pected marginal cost associated with the respective violation
level. 12 In general, the individual will violate the norm whenever
12 If there were no sanction for using a ﬁshing eﬀort beyond ¯ e or if
there were no chance of being detected and sanctioned (i.e. either
s = 0 or θj,i = 0), the ﬁrm would set its catch at the equilibrium
ﬁshing eﬀort level of the basic CPR setting which is greater than the
socially optimum ﬁshing eﬀort. This ﬁshing eﬀort level corresponds
to the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of ﬁshing eﬀort obtained in section 2, see
Appendix 1. Here it should also be noted that as access is limited to
just n ﬁshermen (n ﬁnite) they will still accrue positive rents in this
equilibrium (see, Dasgupta and Heal (1979: 58)). If we drop the as-
sumption of limited entry, i.e. we are no longer in a common property
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the expected marginal cost schedule intersects the marginal rev-
enue schedule at any ﬁshing eﬀort level greater than the norm,
i.e. ei > ¯ e. By contrast, if the expected marginal cost schedule lies
above the marginal revenue schedule for all ei > ¯ e (see point (3))
or intersects the marginal revenue schedule at ei = ¯ e (see point
(2)), the individual will comply with the social norm. In this lat-
ter case of optimal compliance, the marginal revenue, obtained
by using the eﬃcient eﬀort level, is lower or equals the expected
marginal sanction the individual would pay at the zero viola-
tion level. Consequently, increases in the probability of being
detected and sanctioned decrease the individual’s eﬀort as the
expected marginal cost schedule shifts up. Similarly, increases
in the marginal sanction also decrease the individual’s ﬁshing ef-
fort as the marginal cost schedule becomes steeper. With respect
to the marginal revenue schedule, increases in the eﬀort level of
the rest of the population also diminish the agent’s ﬁshing eﬀort
level as the marginal revenue schedule shifts down. By contrast,
an increase in the social norm shifts the expected marginal cost
schedule to the right and therefore increases the individual’s ﬁsh-
ing eﬀort.
Now, let us focus on the agent’s optimal choice of monitoring
eﬀort. Result 3 provides a necessary condition for ensuring that
monitoring activity will be performed by agents.
Result 3: Given ei + mi < 1, a necessary condition for moni-
















regime but in an open-access one, then the ﬁshery will reach equi-
librium at a point where economic rents are totally dissipated (see,
Stevenson (1991: 35-37)).
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Proof of Result 3: Since we assume that ei + mi < 1 by (5e)
we obtain λ = 0. Suppose now that mi > 0. Then, if this choice
of mi is optimal, ∂L
∂mi = 0. Since, from (5d), mi > 0 implies
µ = 0, then by equation (5c) the following condition is clearly












Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction eﬀort level by mi = m∗, for all
players i. Thus, an equilibrium strategy m∗ must satisfy condi-
tion (11). Q.E.D.
This result implies that monitoring will be carried out to the ex-





∂mi s(ej − ¯ e), equals the marginal costs associated
with monitoring,
∂ϕ(m∗)






tivities. From Result 3, it also becomes evident that in this set-
ting the optimal choice of monitoring eﬀort does not depend
upon the eﬀort level used by the individual. However, it does
depend on the eﬀort level chosen by the rest of the population.
Moreover, an important conclusion that can be inferred from this
result is that if monitoring and sanctioning are costly activities,
and there is no reward awarded to those agents who detect and
report a violator, monitoring will never be performed by ratio-
nal ﬁshermen. We formally present this result in Corollary 2 as
follows:
Corollary 2: In the absence of a monetary reward for those
agents who detect and sanction a violator, monitoring will never
be carried out by rational agents.
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Proof of Corollary 2: From equation (11), zero monetary








∂mi = 0 , which never holds since
by deﬁnition
∂ϕ(m∗)





∂mi γ > 0. Q.E.D.
3.2 Fishing and Monitoring as Dependent Decisions
We now consider the case when the choices of ﬁshing and mon-
itoring eﬀort are dependent decisions, that is 1 = ei + mi, and
analyse the norm compliance and monitoring optimal choices.
Result 4: Given ei+mi = 1, a necessary condition for violating
the norm (ei = e∗ > ¯ e) without carrying out monitoring eﬀort













∗ − ¯ e) − γ] (13)
Proof of Result 4: Since we assume that ei + mi = 1 by (5e)
we obtain λ ≥ 0. Then, given an optimal choice of ei and mi




∂s(ei − ¯ e)
∂ei









Suppose now that ei > ¯ e and mi = 0, then from (5b) and (5d)
we have that η = 0 and µ ≥ 0 respectively. Hence equation (14)
becomes:











[s(ej − ¯ e) − γ].
Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction and monitoring eﬀort levels by
ei = e8 with e∗ > ¯ e and mi = m∗ with m∗ = 0, for all players
i. Thus, an equilibrium strategy given by the pair (e∗,m∗) must
satisfy condition (14). Q.E.D.
Result 4 shows that an agent will violate the social norm and
will not carry out monitoring eﬀort whenever her expected net
marginal revenue (net of extractive eﬀort costs) from using a
ﬁshing eﬀort level higher than the socially allowed level is higher
or equals the expected net marginal revenue from monitoring and
sanctioning other agents at zero monitoring level. Thus, if the
marginal probability of detecting and sanctioning another agent
at zero monitoring level and the monetary reward given to those
who monitor and sanction are rather low, and at the same time
the transaction costs associated with eﬀectively sanctioning one
agent and the marginal revenue from extraction are relatively
high, it is likely that there will neither be norm compliance nor
monitoring within the ﬁshery.
Result 5: Given ei+mi = 1, a necessary condition for violating
the norm (ei = e∗ > ¯ e) and still carrying out monitoring eﬀort














∗ − ¯ e) − γ] −
∂ϕ(m∗)
∂mi
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Proof of Result 5: Since we assume that ei + mi = 1 by (5e)
we obtain λ ≥ 0. Then, given an optimal choice of ei and mi




∂s(ei − ¯ e)
∂ei









Suppose now that ei > ¯ e and mi > 0, then from (5b) and (5d)
















Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction and monitoring eﬀort level by
ei = e∗ with e∗ > ¯ e and mi = m∗ with m∗ > 0, for all players
i. Thus, an equilibrium strategy given by the pair (e∗,m∗) must
satisfy condition (16). Q.E.D.
Result 5 shows that an individual violates the social norm and
carries out monitoring eﬀort to the extent that her expected net
marginal revenue from using a ﬁshing eﬀort level higher than the
socially allowed level oﬀsets the expected net marginal revenue
from monitoring and sanctioning other agents. Comparing this
result with Result 4, see equations (13) and (16), it can be no-
ticed that the larger the marginal probability of detecting and
sanction a violator the ﬂatter the schedule associated with the
marginal revenue from monitoring and sanctioning becomes and
therefore the lower the extraction eﬀort in the ﬁshery. By con-
trast, increases in the expected marginal sanction also decrease
the individual’s ﬁshing eﬀort as the schedule associated with the
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marginal revenue from using extractive eﬀort shifts down. Sim-
ilarly, increases in the monitoring eﬀort also aﬀect the schedule
associated with the marginal revenue from ﬁshing as this sched-
ule becomes steeper. This is so because in this setting more mon-
itoring eﬀort devoted in the ﬁshery means less extractive eﬀort.
Result 6: Given ei+mi = 1, a necessary condition for complying
with the norm, i.e. ei = e∗ = ¯ e, and still carry out monitoring




















Proof of Result 6: Since we assume that ei + mi = 1 by (5e)
we obtain λ ≥ 0. Then, given an optimal choice of ei and mi




∂s(ei − ¯ e)
∂ei









Suppose now that ei = ¯ e and mi > 0, then from (5b) and (5d)


















Restricting our attention to symmetric equilibria, we can denote
the Nash equilibrium extraction and monitoring eﬀort level by
ei = e∗ with e∗ = ¯ e and mi = m∗ with m∗ > 0, for all players
i. Thus, an equilibrium strategy given by the pair (e∗,m∗) must
satisfy condition (19). Q.E.D.
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Result 6 shows that an individual complies with the social norm
and carries out monitoring eﬀort to the extent that her expected
net marginal revenue from using a ﬁshing eﬀort equivalent to
the socially allowed level is lower or equals the expected net
marginal revenue from monitoring and sanctioning other agents.
Since in equilibrium all individuals use the same ﬁshing eﬀort,
ei = e−i = e8 with e∗ = ¯ e, and therefore nobody violates the so-
cial norm, there will be no reward possible for those individuals
who monitor and sanction. As monitoring and sanctioning are
costly activities the net marginal revenue from monitoring and
sanctioning is negative. In this case the only possibility for this
result to hold is that the individual faces an expected marginal
penalty at the zero violation level greater than the marginal
revenue from using a ﬁshing eﬀort level equivalent to the one
established by the social norm. The same condition can be in-
terpreted in terms of marginal costs. An agent will comply with
the social norm and carry out monitoring eﬀort if and only if the
expected net marginal costs from using a ﬁshing eﬀort equivalent
to the socially allowed level is greater or equal the expected net















In policy terms, this result implies that in order to ensure that
there will be norm compliance and monitoring in the ﬁshery,
the costs of monitoring eﬀort and the expected transaction costs
associated with eﬀectively sanctioning one agent must be low
in comparison with the probability of being detected and the
marginal sanction at zero violation level. At the same time the
marginal revenue from using a ﬁshing eﬀort equivalent to the
socially allowed level must be rather low in comparison with the
expected marginal sanction at zero violation level.
Comparing Result 6 with Results 4 and 5, we can also infer that
an increase in the marginal probability of detecting and sanc-
tioning a violator diminishes the agent’s ﬁshing eﬀort level as the
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(a) Non-Compliance without Monitoring 
 
(b) Non-Compliance with Monitoring 
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(c) Compliance and Monitoring 
Fig. 2. The Norm Compliance and Monitoring Decisions with Depen-
dent Fishing and Monitoring Choices
schedule associated with the marginal revenue from monitoring
and sanctioning becomes ﬂatter. In this case the monitoring ef-
fort level is so high that there is no violation at all. This also
implies that there is no actual monetary reward to those who
monitor and sanction, since no one violates the norm in the ﬁsh-
ery. Let us now provide an additional explanation of Results 4,
5 and 6 through a graphical analysis.
From Figure 2 we can infer that the individual will devote ﬁsh-
ing eﬀort to a level e∗ in excess of the norm, e∗ > ¯ e, where the
expected net marginal revenue from ﬁshing equals the expected
net marginal revenue from monitoring and sanctioning associ-
ated with the respective violation level. Unlike results 1 and 2,
see ﬁgure 1, in this setting, the choices of ﬁshing and monitoring
eﬀorts are dependent, so there is a trade-oﬀ between using ﬁsh-
ing and monitoring eﬀorts. This means that the more eﬀort an
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agent devote to ﬁshing the less she can allocate to monitoring
and vice versa. Hence, the optimal compliance and monitoring
decisions are made by comparing the marginal beneﬁts of each
activity. Panel (a) shows the case where in equilibrium there is
non-compliance without monitoring, panel (b) shows the inter-
mediate case where there is non-compliance with monitoring and
panel (c) where there is compliance and monitoring. In general,
from ﬁgure 2 it is easy to see that an individual will violate the
norm whenever the schedule associated with the marginal rev-
enue from ﬁshing lies above the schedule of the marginal revenue
from monitoring and sanctioning for all ei < 1 or intersects the
schedule of the marginal revenue from monitoring and sanction-
ing precisely at ei = 1. By contrast, in order to have compliance
and monitoring in the ﬁshery, schedule of the marginal revenue
from monitoring and sanctioning must lie above the schedule as-
sociated with the marginal revenue from ﬁshing for all ei > ¯ e
or must intersect the schedule of marginal revenue from ﬁshing
precisely at ei = ¯ e. From Figure 2 it can also be inferred that in-
creases in the marginal probability of detecting and sanction a vi-
olator will diminish the agent’s ﬁshing eﬀort level as the marginal
revenue from monitoring and sanctioning schedule becomes ﬂat-
ter. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these increases in the
monitoring eﬀort level will necessarily imply higher total mon-
itoring costs and lower monetary rewards to those agents who
monitor and sanction violators since in this setting more moni-
toring means less extractive eﬀort. These eﬀects are clearly re-
ﬂected in the equilibrium conditions shown in Results 4, 5 and 6.
On the other hand, an increase in the expected marginal sanction
also diminishes the individual’s ﬁshing eﬀort as the marginal rev-
enue from using a ﬁshing eﬀort schedule shifts down. Likewise,
increases in the monitoring eﬀort level make the schedule of the
marginal revenue from ﬁshing becomes steeper, since these in-
creases in monitoring imply that less extractive eﬀort is devoted
in the ﬁshery as a whole.
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4 Concluding Remarks
A ﬁrst conclusion that can be inferred from our analysis is that
in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the
ﬁshing community, namely norms or rules aimed at restricting
the use of the commonly owned resource, TURFs can not avoid
the economic over-exploitation of the ﬁshery. Indeed, even as-
suming that the access to the ﬁshery is eﬀectively enforced by the
external regulatory authority, TURFs legislation only transform
the open access problem in a common property resources prob-
lem, and therefore there will still be economic over-exploitation,
where ﬁshing ﬁrms will use more eﬀort than that which is socially
optimal. This implies that some form of internal regulation is re-
quired for TURFs to produce the desired changes in terms of
aggregated eﬀort used in the ﬁshery.
Another implication from our work, speciﬁcally from the static
game of norm compliance presented in section 3, is the impor-
tance of economic incentives (and disincentives) in the formula-
tion of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of
the MEP. This is particularly important for ﬁshing communities
with no tradition in co-operative management. Indeed, from our
analysis of the norm compliance and monitoring decisions when
the choices of ﬁshing and monitoring eﬀorts are independent de-
cisions, it becomes clear that if monitoring and sanctioning are
costly activities, in the absence of economic incentives for those
agents who detect and report a violator, monitoring will never
be performed by rational ﬁshermen (see Result 3 and Corollary
2). This in turn implies that even considering very large mon-
etary sanctions to violators, compliance of the social norm will
not necessarily be ensured, e.g. if the monitoring eﬀort level of
each individual within the ﬁshery is actually zero this implies
non-compliance of the norm (see Results 1 and 2 and Corollary
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2).
These results on the importance of economic incentives and dis-
incentives are also conﬁrmed in the most restrictive setting anal-
ysed in section 3, that where the choices of ﬁshing and moni-
toring eﬀorts are considered to be dependent. In this case there
is a trade-oﬀ between using ﬁshing and monitoring eﬀorts. This
means that the more eﬀort an agent devote to ﬁshing the less
she can allocate to monitoring and vice versa. Hence, the opti-
mal compliance and monitoring decisions are made by compar-
ing the marginal beneﬁts of each activity. Clearly in this case,
if the marginal beneﬁts from ﬁshing are very large in compari-
son with the marginal beneﬁts from monitoring and sanctioning,
the higher will be the extractive eﬀort spent by each ﬁshermen
and consequently the lower will be her monitoring eﬀort (see Re-
sults 4, 5 and 6). This implies that in order to ensure compliance
and monitoring, it is necessary to formulate economic incentives
to increase the marginal beneﬁts from monitoring and sanction-
ing and economic disincentives to decrease the marginal beneﬁts
from using a ﬁshing eﬀort higher than the socially allowed level.
Our results on the relevance of economic incentives in the context
of a TURF regulation can also be used to highlight the impor-
tance of less conventional enforcement tools. The implementation
of TURF, especially in communities where previous experience
with this type of property rights is absent, the regulation might
require to be supported with enforcement strategies that sub-
stitutes traditional tools, like the monitoring activity to detect
violations and the imposition of sanctions. For example, increas-
ing the perception of legitimacy of the regulation as well as the
sense of belonging to the community or organization among the
regulated population, might help to induce compliance with the
norm even in the absence of monetary rewards.
Furthermore, despite the importance of the enforcement of the
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MEP to ensure an eﬀective TURF regulation, currently all re-
lated regulation focus mainly on the biological and technical
aspects of the ﬁshery exploitation, leaving out of the analysis
the economic considerations which are crucial to understand the
strategic behaviour of the ﬁshermen. The Chilean Fisheries and
Aquaculture Law, for example, does not speciﬁcally ask for the
detail of the norms and internal regulations to be used by the
community to guarantee the compliance of the MEP. According
to the results shown in this article, for the regulatory authority
to know this information is vital to ensure that these ﬁshing asso-
ciations take into account the potential problems associated with
self-regulation prior they are granted the rights of exploitation.
This is especially relevant in cases where the ﬁshery in question
has been traditionally over-exploited in an open-access regime,
and no previous form of community organisation has existed be-
fore the proposal for the use rights, which is precisely the case
of some Chilean ﬁsheries under TURFs.
Finally, in terms of future lines of research related to the top-
ics addressed in this article, it can be mentioned the empirical
testing of the models of norm compliance formulated here. This
would require conducting interviews in ﬁsheries regulated under
TURFs to get data for the econometric study. This survey should
include ﬁsheries where co-operative management has worked and
where it has not, so it can be empirically determined the determi-
nants of compliance and non-compliance. 13 Once validated the
theoretical results presented here, another topic of research con-
sists in the design of speciﬁc regulations aimed at ensuring that
ﬁshing communities asking for ﬁshing use rights do appropriately
consider the problems associated with the issue of enforcement
of the MEP.
13 For a methodological guideline for this type of econometric study
see for instance, Sutinen and Gauvin (1989).
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Appendix 1:
Proof of Proposition 1: 14 Denote the average product by A(e1+
... + en) =
H(e1+...+ei−1+ei+ei+1+...+en)
(e1+...+ei−1+ei+ei+1+...+en) . It can be easily checked
that
∂A(e1+...+en)
∂ei < 0 and
∂2A(e1+...+en)
∂e2
i < 0. Hence the optimisa-
tion problem presented in equation (1) becomes: (A1) Ri(ei,e−i)
= eiA(e1 +...+ei−1 +ei +ei+1 +...+en)−cei. The ﬁrst-order













1 + ... + e∗
i−1 + e∗
i+1 + ... + e∗
n. Substituting e∗
i
into (A2), summing over all n players’ ﬁrst-order conditions, and
then dividing by n yields: (A3) A(E∗)+ 1
NE∗ ∂A(E∗)
∂ei −c = 0 where
E∗ = e∗
1+...+e∗
n denotes the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing eﬀort. In
contrast, the social optimum denoted by ¯ E = ¯ ei+...+¯ en solves:
max
0≤E≤∞ EA(E)−Ec. The ﬁrst-order condition for which is: (A4)
A( ¯ E) + ¯ E
∂A( ¯ E)
∂ei − c = 0. Let us suppose that E∗ < ¯ E. Then
A(E∗) ≥ A( ¯ E), since
∂A(e1+...+en)







i < 0. Finally, E∗
n < ¯ E. As this implies
that A(E∗)+ 1
NE∗ ∂A(E∗)
∂ei −c > A( ¯ E)+ ¯ E
∂A( ¯ E)
∂ei −c the inequality
E∗ < ¯ E will never hold since by equation (A3) and (A4) we know
that A(E∗) + 1
NE∗ ∂A(E∗)
∂ei − c = A( ¯ E) + ¯ E)
∂A( ¯ E)
∂ei − c. Therefore
we have proved that E∗ > ¯ E. Q.E.D.
14 This proof is based on Gibbons (1992: 27-29)
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